Bismarck Has Been Described as an Exponent of Realpolitik free essay sample

Otto von Bismarck; the ‘Iron Chancellor’ is widely regarded as a sagacious enforcer of realpolitik and this political approach is greatly responsible for his success in the unification of the German states. Realpolitik is a pragmatic system of politics based on practical realisation of ones goals more so than moral or ideological considerations. This method of politics often relies on the utilisation of opportunities spontaneously as they present themselves at the resignation of prior plans and considerations. Aptly described by Friedrich von Holstein once a colleague of Bismarck as â€Å"someone who uses people as tools, like knives and forks, which are changed after each course†. This description of Bismarck by a member of his inner political circle as a manipulative aggrandizer exhibits Bismarck quite clearly – as a true exponent of realpolitik. Bismarck, was born into a land owning family from the junker class, and graduated from university with a history and law-degree. We will write a custom essay sample on Bismarck Has Been Described as an Exponent of Realpolitik or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page He was an alcoholic womanizer who never enjoyed his one-year of military service, finding it difficult to take orders from someone else. This idea shapes Bismarck’s greatest goal of collapsing the Bund and forming a new German confederation with Prussia, not Austria at the helm so that he could devise the terms of European operation and not have to comply with Austria. He entered politics in 1847 and believed that executive autocracy was the only manner of ruling, believing that might was unarguably right. This giving root to his fervent desire to raise a well trained Prussian army and is the reason for his success in the Danish, Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars as well as collapsing the Bund and uniting Germany. Throughout his political career Bismarck shrewdly operated in a manner that many would describe as deceitful, cunning and unscrupulous yet in a time period of less than 7 years he had taken the divided states of Germany and unified them under one flag. In collaboration with Minister of War von Roon and Chief of Staff von Moltke, Bismarck presented to Wilhelm I and the Prussian parliament his intention to increase the size of the army and introduce various other army reforms. This particular request was met with dismay among the liberals who dominated the Diet and Wilhelm who were unsure of the need to expand the Prussian army and unwilling to pay the extra tax to fund these reforms. Upon the understandable rejection of this proposal, von Roon sent Bismarck the famous telegram: â€Å"Delay is dangerous. Hurry†. This was the opportunity Bismarck had been waiting for, tearing up the abdication document, driving liberals from the office, stifling the press and encouraging Wilhelm to create the new units by collecting existing taxation. With an expanded army Bismarck resolved to achieve unification with â€Å"iron and blood† rather than liberal methods. Bismarck famously declared when speaking to the Prussian National Assembly in 1862 â€Å"Majority verdicts will the great decisions of the time be made – that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849 – but by iron and blood. † The liberal rejection of army reforms gave Wilhelm only one option – the appointment of Bismarck as Minister-President of Prussia. The conflict with Denmark regarding the two duchies Schleswig and Holstein was manipulated by Bismarck to accommodate his goals for German unity. As a clear indicator of his perceptive approach to the annexation of the duchies, Bismarck successfully isolated Denmark by ensuring that it had no major power as an ally. This was a hallmark, of Bismarck’s military strategy, a distinctive modus operandi (mode of operation) used to ensure victory in many conflicts such as the Austro-Prussian war of 1865 and the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. This was swiftly achieved in regard to the Danish war, or the Schleswig-Holstein conflict. Russia was sympathetic to the Prussian cause as a result Prussian support in every act except war during Polish mutiny of 1863, France was bribed by hints of compensation in the Rhineland and Austria was persuaded to form an alliance with Prussia to consume the duchies and expand the Bund in the hope of gaining more territory and taxpayers. Britain obstinately refused to join an alliance standing firmly behind Denmark, British statesmen Lord Palmerston stating, â€Å"if Denmark had to fight she would not fight alone†. Bismarck shrewdly called Palmerston’s bluff and together with Austria invaded Denmark in February 1864. The Danes were soundly beaten and within 2 weeks the war had ended. The Convention of Gastein in 1865 announced that Prussia would have control of Schleswig and Austria would have control of Holstein. No one saw through Bismarck’s policy of annexation. Europe hadn’t realised that the duchies had become a question of force not right or law. Prussia had the required force. Bismarck was now confident that he could initiate a quarrel with Austria over the government of Holstein and he was confident that the might of the Prussian army would over-power the insignificant army of Austria. In joining an alliance with Austria; Bismarck had ascertained necessary information about Austrians military style, size and capability. Using carefully calculated diplomatic skill to manipulate the powers of Europe and his cardinal policy of realpolitik, Bismarck ensured Denmark’s defeat and laid the foundations of war with Austria. The convention of Gastein in 1865 had given Austria Holstein, a piece of land that held immense strategic importance because of the Kiel canal, yet it had been placed between 2 Prussian territories, Schleswig in the North and Prussia in the south giving Prussia strength on all fronts. As well as the geographical gains, Bismarck was confident that he could now proclaim the whole of the northern German states under Prussian control and drive Austria from her dominant position in Europe. Claims of maladministration from Bismarck were immoral but were necessary to appeal to more delicate consciences like King Wilhelm and infuriated the Austrians and so Bismarck proposed a reform the Confederation by which Austria would be entirely omitted from German affairs. Suggesting a German parliament would replace the Confederation Diet in an attempt to get liberals and nationalists on his side. This further angered Austrians who felt that a war would be necessary to re-assert themselves as the dominant power in Europe and to prevent further manipulation by Bismarck. The Austrians vehemently believed that they should attack the insolent Prussia, with Bismarck at the helm. The Austro-Prussian war had come, and Bismarck had convinced the people that it was purely defensive. Schleswig and Holstein was cleverly manipulated by Bismarck from a political debacle to a casus belli (an act or situation provoking or justifying war). The war with Austria was no different to the conflict with the Danish duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in that Bismarck successfully isolated the enemy by denying them the opportunity to establish any allies with a major European power. Once again, the Russians were benevolent to the Prussian cause as a result of their support during Polish rebellion of 1863. Whilst the French were kept removed from the war with talk of future compensation offering Belgian territory and the Bavarian Palatinate an area laced with coal. Napoleon proved his ingenuousness to the situation once more thinking an Austrian victory was imminent and that both combatants would be exhausted from the conflict hoping to reap the advantages following the war. An alliance was created with Italy so that they would attack in the rear if the war would come within 3 months, with a Prussian victory ensuring the annexation of Venetian territory. Britain were uninterested in continental affairs rather concerning themselves with their expanding empire in India, South Africa and Australia. Against hostile states in the North and centre, the Prussian army walked in and took possession, with victory at Konnigratz (Sadowa) and Bohemia the conflict was settled with Austria and Saxony. The Prussians superior weaponry, training, railway and tactical planning had swiftly done away with the crumbling Austrian empire. The entire conflict was over before the guileless Napoleon III could reap any advantage from it, whilst the Italians had no real influence in the main seat of war; they were rather used as a distraction on Austrian’s southern front in a successful attempt to divide the Austrian armed forces. The magnanimous conditions that Bismarck imposed on the defeated Austria was another explicit example of his employment of realpolitik. Bismarck was aware that he did not want a permanent enemy in the Austrians and so he demanded a halt of any victory marches and ensured that the only annexation of Austrian territory would be the province of Venetia to the Italians. He ensured that no war indemnities were inflicted and rapidly ended hostilities to rob France of a chance to intervene. His goal was not to make Austria a permanent enemy but simply to expel her from German leadership, this arrangement formed the Treaty of Prague in 1866. This treaty inflicted a blow greater than any indemnity could; it forced Austria to recognise the abolition of the Bund and the establishment of the North German Confederation in its place which saw her the Austrian states excluded. The defeated German states entered the Confederation except for Bavaria, Baden and Wurtemberg at the discretion of Napoleon III. He felt that the extension of German territory past the river Main would endanger the safety of the French nation. Napoleon was now terrified of this all rapidly developing political giant on its Eastern border and the autocrat who was unifying it. Prussia’s victory over Austria in the recent Austro-Prussian war of 1866 increased tensions between France and Prussia. Napoleon felt that Prussia was growing far too strong to be ignored. Many French military leaders were perturbed by the surprising Prussian victory at Konnigratz and demanded urgent military reforms. The Austro-Prussian war served as an abrupt warning to their rapidly diminishing military prowess. The realization that their unchallenged military power 50 years earlier was now subordinate in light of the growing empire to their  east frightened many French leaders and resulted in frantic attempt at military ameliorations. Both Bismarck and Napoleon III needed a war too address their respective political desires. After the war of 1866, a war between France and Prussia was imminent and could have happened at any time. During these four years both were preparing for war, Bismarck was gathering southern German support in Bavaria, Baden, Hesse and Wurtemburg the catholic German states of the south that had not joined the Northern German Confederation. He was rousing German nationalism and was waiting for a pretext for war, he needed a casus belli (an act or situation provoking or justifying war) so that he could convince his southern states that France was the aggressor and persuaded them to join the Prussian military. Napoleon on the other hand was ruminating as to how he could beat this Prussian army, and spent this time gaining support for his army reforms. It was imminent that France and Prussia would go to war and thee victor would establish themselves as the presiding European power. In 1869 the Spanish Cortes (parliament) presented Bismarck with his casus belli (an act or situation provoking or justifying war). They offered the throne of Spain to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen nephew of Kaiser Wilhelm I. Bismarck shrewdly recognised this as his opportunity for war, if he could place Leopold on the Spanish throne France would have two German Hohenzollern monarchies on its borders. For Bismarck there remained one goal in German unification. Austria had been displaced and her crumbling empire had been removed from its supremacy in Europe. The north German Confederation had been formed; and liberals who had been Bismarck’s opposition of yesteryear were in awe by his success had forgive Bismarck for everything. Bismarck’s main supporters formed in the National Liberty party made up of the nationalistically minded liberals who broke off from the radicals. Yet the main south German states still remained outside despite the economic and military binds that they shared. He knew however, that bound in the close vicinity of these two European superpowers, these two states couldn’t maintain neutrality in times of heightened animosity and Bismarck needed them on his side; and thus he knew that he needed France to appear the aggressor. Bismarck insisted that Leopold accepted the offer and when the French minister of foreign affairs, Antoine Alfred Agenor, Duc de Gramont, whom Bismarck touted â€Å"the stupidest man in Europe† heard of it he hurriedly convened the legislature and made a threating speech. He knew that the French army was weaker than the Prussian army, but he ignorantly assumed that if war came, Austria and Denmark would support him as a result of their respective wars against Bismarck. Gramont demanded that Wilhelm renounce the offer and afraid of risking war, he complied. Just as the crisis was entering its final stages without any aggressive action taken by anyone, Gramont rekindled it, writing a letter to Kaiser Wilhelm that he must sign and publish a document renouncing all Prussian claims to the Spanish throne. A report of this was telegrammed to Bismarck who was elated by this, much to the surprise of many of his contemporaries. He sought to engineer a French declaration of war by rewording the famous Ems dispatch to make it sound as if the Kaiser had treated the French envoy in a demeaning fashion. He succeeded to coerce the French into declaring war on Prussia so that the southern German states would join the north German alliance and ensure the neutrality of the other great powers. The telegram was reworded and aroused war fever in France and the Germanic states. No-one saw through Bismarck’s aggressively subtle foreign policy and on July 19, 1870 France declared war on Prussia. The catholic German states in the south seeing France as the aggressor, swiftly came to the aid of Prussia. The Franco-Prussian war astonished Europe b the ease with which the much-vaunted French military prowess crumbled before the ruthless efficiency of the Prussian troops. Strasbourg, Sedan, Metz were at Prussia’s feet. The organisation of Bismarck to secure the requisite political conditions ensured the work of Roon, Moltke and the Kaiser were not in vain. The political ingenuousness of Napoleon III was harshly exposed by Bismarck’s diplomatic brilliance in his isolation of any major powers. Italy was readily on Prussia’s side, while France occupied Rome and as a result of the annexation of Venetia back to the Italians. Russia was bribed not to interfere by suggestion that she should repudiate the clauses of the 1856 treaty restrict her right to warships on the Black Sea. Britain was alienated by Bismarck’s publication at the critical moment of the French proposal of 1866 to annex Belgium. Austria and the south German states had been partly reconciled by the lenient treatment after the Seven Weeks’ War, and the south German states were bound in military alliance to Prussia. France had no friend in Europe and left alone in a state of internal dissension to face the Prussian armies she was powerless – and it was as a direct result of Bismarck’s implementation of realpolitik. Bismarck’s main object had already been achieved prior to the end of the war and the signing of the treaty of Frankfurt. In the flush of ebullience and enthusiasm for the common cause the south German states were ready to unite with the North German Confederation into a German empire. On 18th of January 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles the German Empire was solemnly proclaimed with William as the first German emperor or Kaiser. The setting was pertinent, Versailles stood more than anything else for the historic, aggressive glory of France. Now, in its place, with the capital Paris lay starving and under siege, a triumphant Germany rose by and through the humiliation of the most brilliant civilisation in Europe. The Hall of Victors would reflect another scene of equal importance before 50 years were out, with the roles of the victor and the vanquished reversed. And so, Otto von Bismarck the iron chancellor of Prussia had taken the Germanic states of Europe and unified them by carefully manipulating opportunities as they presented themselves and meticulous planning in seven years. His utilisation of realpolitik is heralded as the defining factor in Prussia’s military success between 1864 and 1871 and as a result the unification of the German states. It is without question that the achievements of Bismarck stand testament to the innumerable claims of an unscrupulous, cruel, manipulative, deceitful prime minister of Prussia, yet they also manifest themselves to conclusively display the brilliance of the man and his policy of realpolitik.